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Abstract 
In this research, we investigate the citizen hijacking of the Twitter hashtag #myNYPD in 
response to a public relations campaign by the New York City Police Department in 
April of 2014. Using counterpublic sphere theory, we examine how Twitter was used as a 
platform to organize, generate, and promote counterpublic narratives about racial 
profiling, police misconduct and police violence. Through a combination of large-scale 
network analysis and qualitative discourse analysis, we detail emergent counterpublic 
structure and leadership, specific discursive strategies deployed by crowdsourced elites 
within communities of resistance, and the reception of online counterpublic activism in 
mainstream media. We conclude with implications for understanding the evolving nature 
of counterpublics in the second decade of the 21st-century, with particular consideration 
to the roles of new and old media in (re)shaping public debates around marginalization, 
profiling, and policing. 
 Keywords: social media, activism, counterpublic sphere theory, crowdsourced 
elites, social network analysis, discourse analysis, police brutality 
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Hijacking #myNYPD: Social Media Dissent and Networked Publics 
On April 22, 2014 @NYPDNews, the official Twitter account for the New York City 
Police Department, invited citizens to share photographs of New York City police officers using 
the hashtag #myNYPD to identify their posts (see Fig. 1).  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
What started as a public relations campaign quickly turned into an online protest as 
thousands of citizens appropriated the #myNYPD hashtag to highlight instances of police 
brutality, abuse, and racial profiling (see Fig. 2).  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
In total, over 100,000 #myNYPD messages were tweeted between April 22 and 24, 2014. 
The vast majority of these messages propagated counternarratives that were direct challenges to 
the original goals of the New York City Police Department. A form of media activism under the 
larger umbrella of culture jamming, we refer to this appropriation of #myNYPD as “hijacking.” 
The hijacking of #myNYPD helped to popularize counternarratives about police-citizen 
interactions, setting the tone for discussions on social media and in the mainstream media alike.  
Herein, we explore the hijacking of #myNYPD using counterpublic sphere theory as a 
guiding framework to examine how Twitter is used as a platform to organize, generate, and 
promote counterpublic narratives. We argue that this hijacking, and the online and offline 
response to it, illustrates the democratizing potential of Twitter and the evolving strategies of 
citizen-activists in the age of new media. Through a combination of large-scale network analysis 
and qualitative discourse analysis, we offer insight on emergent counterpublic structure and 
leadership, the specific discursive strategies deployed by crowdsourced elites within 
communities of resistance, and the reception of online counterpublic activism in the mainstream 
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media. We conclude with implications for understanding the evolving nature of counterpublics in 
the second decade of the 21 profiling, and policing.  
Theorizing Networked Counterpublics 
 Habermas’ The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989) represents 
something of an epicenter for communication research on the relationship between citizen 
deliberation, media, and the state. While Habermas idealized the role of the bourgeoisie public in 
the maintenance of democratic societies, scholars studying traditionally marginalized voices, 
particularly those of women and African Americans, developed and applied the concept of 
counterpublics to describe the unique sites and methods members of these groups use to produce 
non-dominant forms of knowledge. Thus, when Fraser (1992) offered her extensive critique of 
Habermas' conceptualization of the public sphere, it was welcomed and extended by a diverse set 
of scholars seeking to explain the role of power, access, and social identity in defining the public 
and civil society (e.g. Asen & Brouwer, 2001; Black Public Sphere Collective, 1995; Dean, 
1992; Goodnight, 1997; Hauser, 1998; Jackson, 2014; Squires, 2002).  
What is significant about counterpublics, beyond the role they play in legitimizing and 
sustaining marginalized communities, is that these sites explicitly and strategically seek to 
challenge the “dominant knowledge” inherent to the mainstream public sphere (Felski, 1989; 
Squires, 2001). As Asen and Brouwer (2001) have described, “many publics arise from the 
demands made by long-suppressed and marginalized groups for the rights and responsibilities of 
political membership, collective sovereignty, or both. Groups drawing on axes of race, gender, 
class, sexuality, and ethnicity have sought to redeem the promises of democracy” (p. 2). Social 
movement scholars suggest that activist groups similarly construct communicative 
counterpublics from diverse sets of people who share social and political ideologies with the goal 
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of creating mass agitation of, and eventual shifts in, the status quo (de Jong, Shaw, & Stammers, 
2005).  In the twenty-first century, two questions have been crucial to extending this line of 
intellectual inquiry; what is the nature of the relationship between various counterpublics and 
state actors, and how are reconfigurations of the public sphere, particularly those resulting from 
social movements and technological innovations, influencing this relationship?  
Castells (2012) has been at the forefront of theorizing around these questions and has 
explored in depth the role of the Internet in collective debate and decision-making among 
citizens who create networks to subvert the messages of dominant social structures. These 
networks of resistance, according to Castells, contribute to producing “counterpower” - a type of 
power that “challenges the power embedded in the institutions of society for the purpose of 
claiming representation for their own values and interests” (p. 15). More generally, Shirky 
(2008) argues that the Internet, and social media in particular, enables a “mass amateurization” 
of the media, including a shift from professionally-produced news towards citizen journalism, 
and an overall reduction in the coordination costs involved in collective action. Shirky contends 
that this shift away from mainstream media elites can open up space for marginalized voices to 
become influential online in ways that may not have been possible before or without social 
media. Moreover, social media activism may be more nimble than traditional (offline) activism 
because it does not require unified messages or legitimizing groups to influence the terms of 
mainstream political dialogue, with online groups frequently rejecting traditional structures of 
leadership altogether (Castells, 2012). 
This opens up the possibility for counterpublics to leverage the architecture of the social 
web to advance their causes. Leung and Lee (2014), for example, argue that not only do some 
social media networks model the characteristics of a counterpublic because of their outward-
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looking attempt to challenge mainstream narratives and their mobilization impact, they are often 
the first mediated space where marginalized voices are articulated en masse, and thus play a 
pivotal role in influencing larger offline counterpublics. These scholars find that Facebook, in 
their case, plays an important role in strengthening the distribution networks of alternative online 
media and exposing even citizens not actively seeking alternative political narratives to 
counterpublic content. Further, as detailed by Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira (2012) in their 
study of the use of Twitter among Egyptian revolutionaries, social media networks organically 
create “crowdsourced elites,” or emergent leaders who are not necessarily (or even frequently) 
traditional elites. On Twitter, these crowdsourced elites can be anyone who rises to visibility as a 
result of a particular Twitter public’s use of the platform’s features and affordances, including 
retweets, favoriting, and endorsements.  
Because of social media’s connectedness and what Poell (2014) calls the “technological 
architecture” of platforms like Twitter, members of groups whose worldviews are not 
traditionally reflected in mainstream narratives may have more power to rewrite dominant 
narratives than ever before. Certainly, while dominant institutions and the state do not actively 
seek out counterpublic perspectives on Twitter, the site’s technical architecture facilitates the 
spread of information that users can succeed in “trending,” potentially drawing attention from 
even the most elite and mainstream users.  Likewise, retweeting allows porousness between 
publics as individual tweeters who belong to multiple networks retweet information from one 
into another, rapidly elevating discourse beyond specific localities and potentially raising the 
overall profile of some messages (Conover, Davis, Ferrara, McKelvey, Menczer & Flammini, 
2013). Thus, the ongoing difficulty of destabilizing established patterns of traditional media 
power does not erase the potential of social media activism to both attract the attention of 
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mainstream journalists and engage in more autonomous and community-specific forms of self-
representation (Poell, 2014). 
We view the hijacking of #myNYPD, and hijackings that address a range of issues on 
Twitter, as a digital extension of counterpublic traditions.1 As documented by scholars like 
Jacobs (2000) and Lawrence (2000), discursive attempts by members of counterpublics to 
introduce counternarratives into mainstream media coverage of police-citizen interactions are not 
new. As we discuss in detail below, such attempts were clear in the hijacking of #myNYPD by 
citizens like @MoreAndAgain and organizations like CopWatch who discursively worked, in 
140 characters or less, to rewrite narratives of heroism, criminality, and victimhood often taken 
for granted in dominant conceptualizations of policing. Our research contributes to the larger 
scholarly project to theorize and quantify the impact of counterpublics’ use of social media to 
challenge the state and influence the mainstream public sphere. Using #myNYPD as an example 
of the evolving power of counterpublics, we identify Twitter as a new and rapidly evolving space 
for these protests and discourse, a space that offers unique possibilities for public debate among 
activists, citizens, and media-makers seeking to define and redefine the meaning of policing. 
We focus here exclusively on Twitter given 1) the immense amount of data available 
from this single platform, and 2) because social media efficacy in constructing and influencing 
public debates cannot be generalized given that various platforms do not share the same 
technological and economic/cultural features and thus are used by citizens in ways uniquely 
adapted to their specific qualities (Poell, 2014). For example, Twitter as a platform is particularly 
efficient at constructing near real-time narratives alongside highly visual embedded and linked 
content. As many have pointed out, interrogating the specific user practices and platform 
architecture of Twitter is crucial to conceptualizing the potential of tweets to build and circulate 
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networks (Poell, 2014; Conover, Ferrara, Menczer & Flammini, 2013). Twitter then, can be 
considered a “social awareness stream” that allows for the combining of individual citizen-
produced counternarratives, particularly through hashtagging and retweeting, into larger 
discourses reflective of counterpublics that challenge state repression (Papacharissi and de 
Fatima Oliveira, 2012).  
Building on work examining the role of Twitter in social movements more generally, this 
multi-methodological study examines how citizens and activist collectives on Twitter worked to 
reframe and retell dominantly-birthed stories about law and order through the hijacking of 
#myNYPD. We combine large-scale network analysis and focused discourse analysis to reveal 
the unique nature of the networks engaged in this hijacking. We also examine how mainstream 
news responded to attempts to challenge dominant cultural narratives about policing through a 
discourse analysis of mainstream coverage of #myNYPD.  
As an exploratory project drawing on quantitative and qualitative methods, this research 
is guided by three central research questions: 
RQ1. Who most centrally influenced the hijacking of #myNYPD and what publics do 
their networks represent?  
RQ2. How did the communication norms and affordances of Twitter enable these publics 
to disrupt dominant narratives of policing, and what does the hijacking of #myNYPD reveal 
about Twitter’s potential as a counterpublic?  
RQ3. What frames were used by mainstream newsmakers to cover the hijacking of 
#myNYPD? 
In investigating these questions, we engage in a larger scholarly dialogue on the public 
sphere and networked communication theories. 
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Methods 
The present analysis details how #myNYPD was hijacked, by who, and the implications 
for both counterpublic and mainstream public spheres. We use two main sources of data: Twitter 
messages containing the hashtag #myNYPD, and mainstream news coverage of the hashtag.  
Twitter data 
Twitter is a microblogging service that enables users to communicate via short messages 
called “tweets.” For this analysis, we gathered a sample of tweets via the Twitter streaming 
application programming interface (API). The streaming API allows researchers to “listen” to a 
randomly selected sample of twitter data in near real-time, downloading and storing publicly 
available data for future use. In this case, we downloaded 13,631 tweets sent between April 22 
and April 24, 2014 containing the #myNYPD hashtag, or 10% of the total number of #myNYPD 
tweets sent during that period.2  
Network specification  
In order to identify influential tweets for this analysis, we generated a network of Twitter 
users connected by mentions and retweets, two common conversational conventions on the 
platform. When users mention or retweet one another on Twitter, they use a specific pattern of 
characters, or syntax, to refer to one another within the body of a tweet (boyd, Golder & Lotan, 
2010). We generated the #myNYPD network for analysis using Freelon’s (2013) T2G for Python 
converter, which scans tweet text for mention and retweet syntax and creates a directed link from 
each retweet or mention back to the original tweet author. The resulting network included 13,074 
nodes (unique users) connected by 10,487 directed links, the majority of which (72%) 
represented retweets. From this, we extracted the largest weakly connected component of the 
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network, which included 7,338 nodes connected by 8,392 directed links. All subsequent analyses 
were performed on this giant component.  
Identifying elites 
From the #myNYPD network, we took a sub-sample of the most popular tweets for 
qualitative discourse analysis. There are a number of ways to measure “popularity” within a 
social network; in this case, we used a basic measure of in-degree to identify the most 
mentioned/retweeted users in the network (Hanneman & Riddle, 2005), and then extracted the 
tweets related to those users via Twitter retweet or mention. These most retweeted/mentioned 
users can be understood as what Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira (2012) have identified as 
crowdsourced elites.  
Like many social networks, the in-degree distribution of the #myNYPD network 
followed roughly a power-law distribution (Barabasí, 1999), with an average in-degree of 1.14, 
and a range of in-degree from 0 to 660. Although there is no conventional mathematical way to 
select “the most popular” from such a distribution, a visual inspection of the degree distribution 
revealed a break around in-degree 100, or after the 12 highest in-degree nodes, after which the 
differences in degree distribution became more regular. Thus, we selected the tweets associated 
with these 12 highest in-degree nodes for inclusion in our qualitative discourse analysis. Of note, 
these nodes were selected based on their mathematical properties alone, without any a priori 
filtering on their ideological or demographic affiliations. The resulting sample included a total of 
2,653 individual tweets, all of which included at least one mention or retweet (but usually 
retweet) of one of the top 12 highest in-degree nodes.  
Identifying discursive frames in #myNYPD 
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Qualitative discourse analysis was then used to investigate the meaning-making processes 
within this data. This method allowed us to go beyond the descriptive results of network 
analytics to gauge how and to what end crowdsourced elites ideologically used #myNYPD. We 
analyzed tweets associated with the 12 highest in-degree nodes, the accounts of our 
crowdsourced elites, for how the overall use of language, explicit and implicit values, image and 
tone were used to make #myNYPD semantically meaningful. As Schroder (2012) details, 
discourse, both mediated and non-mediated, has the power to frame and define social reality, a 
power undergoing constant negotiation and struggle. We consider the creation of #myNYPD and 
its subsequent hijacking a clear example of this negotiative process. Further, the combination of 
quantitative methodologies with the qualitative ones we employ here is often the most rigorous 
way of analyzing the meaning-making processes that occur as various forces compete to 
discursively define social issues in the public sphere (Bruhn Jensen, 2012).  
Analyzing mainstream news coverage of #myNYPD  
Given the significance mainstream media continue to play in defining and limiting issues 
in the public sphere, and given the increasing influence new media technologies like Twitter 
have on mainstream journalists, we conducted an analysis of mainstream coverage of the 
hijacking of #myNYPD to assess whether the counternarratives constructed by citizens on 
Twitter were legitimized in the mainstream public sphere.3 We collected data from mainstream 
news organizations via a search of #myNYPD on LexisNexis for the same date range as our 
Twitter data. For this analysis we included broadcast news transcripts from the top-rated national 
networks and channels including CNN, FoxNews, MSNBC, NBC, ABC, and CBS and articles 
from New York-based newspapers ranging from The New York Times to the New York Daily 
News. We felt it important to include both sets of sources so as to understand the similarities and 
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differences in national and local coverage of #myNYPD and the ways this coverage did or did 
not vary across mainstream platforms. We analyzed all #myNYPD stories from these sources for 
the language, discourse, and value assumptions used to construct frames about the development 
and evolution of the hashtag. 
Results 
#myNYPD network structure and crowdsourced elites  
The #myNYPD retweet/mention network, including 7,338 nodes connected by 8,392 
links, appears in Figure 3, below. In the graph, individual nodes (Twitter users) are represented 
by discs, connected by links (retweets/mentions) represented as lines and color coded to 
distinguish clusters of users retweeting/mentioning the same central node. Nodes are sized by in-
degree, with the 12 highest in-degree nodes (the crowdsourced elites) labeled with Twitter 
usernames. Taken as a whole, the network is best characterized as a broadcast network, with a 
distinctive hub-and-spoke structure where most nodes in the network radiate out from a small 
number of central nodes - the crowdsourced elites. This structure indicates many users are 
retweeting content from a small number of central sources, without otherwise interacting with 
one another (Smith, Rainie, Schneiderman & Himelboim, 2014).  
[insert Figure 3 here] 
Smith and colleagues (2014) suggest that broadcast networks are most often associated 
with breaking news stories or advocacy; to the extent that the #myNYPD hijacking constituted a 
form of advocacy, the emergent structure of this network may not be especially surprising. 
However, of note, this structure is distinct from the politically polarized structure of Twitter 
more generally (Conover, Ratkiewicz, Francisco, Gonçalves, Menczer & Flammini, 2011) 
because #myNYPD spread primarily, if not completely, via critiques of the NYPD, and not 
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because of debates between its critics and defenders. A post-hoc inspection of the tweets 
associated with the top 100 most re-tweeted nodes in the network revealed none that could be 
characterized as defending or supporting police, suggesting that any online backlash to the 
#myNYPD hijacking either failed to be retweeted with any significance, failed to gain notice 
among the core discussion network, or simply failed to exist altogether. Indeed, #myNYPD 
trended without the help of the mainstream community, making the #myNYPD network an 
inversion of the typical power balance in mainstream and counterpublic spheres; for #myNYPD, 
members of the counterpublic community were the most visible and vocal elites 
While the hubs in Twitter broadcast networks are often mainstream elites (Smith et al, 
2014), that was not the case for #myNYPD. The hubs - or crowdsourced elites - in the 
#myNYPD network include a mix of activist organizations, citizens unaffiliated with any 
particular organization, and independent media organizations. Notably, the news organizations 
that appear most frequently as crowdsourced elites are not those that fall within the mainstream 
public sphere in America, but rather organizations with a focus on advocacy and citizen 
journalism and/or a model based outside the United States. These sources, including @Vice, the 
Brooklyn-based news organization self-described as “created by and for a connected 
generation...shining a light on underreported stories around the globe,” @RT_America, an 
English-language affiliate of Russia Today news networks with a focus on “broadcasting stories 
to make you Question More,” and @AJStream, an account run by U.S.-based staff of Al Jazeera 
networks that describes itself as “a web community and daily television show powered by social 
media and citizen journalism.” That these were the most influential news organizations in the 
network is an indication that these accounts were offering a type of coverage of #myNYPD that 
was preferred by members of the network over that of more traditional news organizations.  
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 Notably however, these alternative news sources were not most central to the viral 
hijacking of #myNYPD; rather their presence in the network reflects their significant coverage of 
the hijacking after it began. Instead, it was activist collectives, including two Occupy accounts 
(@OccupyWallStNYC in New York City, USA and @OccBayStreet in Toronto, Ontario, 
Canada), CopWatch, and Anonymous, that make up four out of the top five most 
retweeted/mentioned crowdsourced elites. Further, individual tweeters rounded out the 
crowdsourced elites found here. These individual citizens used their voices to hijack #myNYPD 
in ways that may have been restricted in more organizational settings. Some of these individuals 
had histories of online activism, like @MoreAndAgain who was behind the online campaign that 
pressured publishers to halt negotiations for a book deal with one of the jurors from the trial of 
George Zimmerman, the man tried and acquitted for the murder of unarmed black teenager 
Trayvon Martin.  
 Many of these individual crowdsourced elites were women and/or people of color. We 
identified the demographic characteristics of these users though a combination of their profile 
pictures, self-identification in Twitter bios and in other online spaces, and Google searches. The 
race/ethnicity and gender diversity reflected by individual crowdsourced elites demonstrates that 
Twitter’s activist counterpublics are more inclusive of traditionally marginalized voices than 
mainstream sites of political debate, and, potentially even more inclusive than historical 
counterpublics which were often dominated by the most privileged members of marginalized 
groups. It is also worth noting that the crowdsourced elites found here have a huge range of 
followers from just over 300 to more than one million, with no significant correlation between 
followers and in-degree (r = 0.145, p = 0.653). That diverse individuals with relatively few 
followers were elevated to a similar level of visibility in the hijacking of #myNYPD as 
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organizations with far more followers supports the existence of democratic access in online 
counterpublics. Tweeters who sought to challenge dominant narratives of policing and law and 
order were, by the act of retweeting, highlighting the narratives of those they most valued, and 
these were not traditionally defined elites but relatively unknown citizens and activist collectives: 
a counterpublic. 
The only traditionally elite account among the top 12 most retweeted using #myNYPD 
was the New York Police Department - unsurprising given their initiation of the hashtag and 
attempts to maintain control of it as others subverted their message. What is notable about how 
and why @NYPDNews became among the most retweeted sources is that the vast majority of 
retweets of and responses to them were the result of tweeters responding with ire and criticism. 
Many of the crowdsourced elites using #myNYPD retweeted @NYPDNews’ initial request 
before launching into hours (and days) of tweeting with #myNYPD. For example the below 
tweet from @KimaniFilm, a Twitter account run by a diverse set of filmmakers behind a 
documentary on Kimani Gray, a teenager shot and killed by the NYPD in 2013, was retweeted 
over 1,100 times (Fig. 4).  
[insert Figure 4 here] 
To more fully understand how accounts like @KimaniFilm and other crowdsourced elites 
contributed to a set of counternarratives about the NYPD, and policing in America more 
generally, we present the results of our discursive analysis below. 
Primary discursive trends in the hijacking of #myNYPD  
Crowdsourced elites used two primary discursive strategies, both highly affective, to 
hijack #myNYPD in attempts to introduce counternarratives of policing to the public sphere: 
satire and outrage. These discursive strategies tended to be clustered among crowdsourced elites 
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with particular identities; individual users like @MoreAndAgain and @TheRealKeori used 
humor and snark to draw attention to police brutality while social change organizations like 
CopWatch and Anonymous largely depended on attempts to channel rage into mass outrage.  
Comedy as a cure for brutality. While perhaps falling outside the limiting Habermasian 
definition of “rational” debate, there exists a creative counterpublic tradition that attempts to 
infiltrate the mainstream public sphere by making matters of life and death discursively 
accessible to both in and outgroup members through the universal language of humor. 
Christiansen and Hanson (1996) have described how, for citizens with AIDS in the 1980s, 
comedy was one of the only available rhetorical strategies for challenging religious and 
government institutions that quite literally justified and participated in their deaths. Scholars like 
Watkins (1999) contribute similar analysis of how African Americans have used comedy 
throughout American history to critique racist structures. In both cases, citizens’ use of satire 
reflects the marginalized status of their particular counterpublics, often wholly excluded from the 
mainstream public sphere in America. Thus, using language to make institutions of oppression 
into absurdities is a form of rhetorical power marginalized citizens frequently harness. 
In this tradition, our crowdsourced elites, some members of what scholars like Brock 
(2012) and Florini (2014) have labeled “black Twitter,” used satire to challenge the social role of 
the NYPD. In tweets dripping with irony and sarcasm, these tweeters not only constructed the 
NYPD as a violent, dangerous force engaged in particular in terrorizing New York’s less 
privileged citizens, but as an absurdity deserving of public humiliation. For example, influencer 
@MoreAndAgain tweeted a series of highly circulated tweets that offered sarcastically pleasant 
interpretations of accompanying images of police force. Among @MoreAndAgain’s tweets; 
“You might not have known this, but the NYPD can help you with that kink in your neck. 
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#myNYPD” alongside the image of an NYPD officer kneeling on a half-clothed man’s chest and 
neck, “The #NYPD will also help you de-tangle your hair. #myNYPD” alongside the image of 
three male NYPD officers apparently restraining a woman by her hair, and “If you can’t walk, 
don’t worry, the #NYPD will carry you. How helpful! #myNYPD,” alongside the image of a 
group of officers carrying away a yelling woman whose undergarments are being exposed as a 
result (Figure 5 left). In each of these images the citizens being overpowered by police appear to 
be black and/or Latino and in every case a physical struggle is occurring.  
The power of these satirical tweets, which rarely made explicit claims against the NYPD, 
but instead depended heavily on the juxtaposition of seemingly innocuous and/or sarcastic 
commentary with images and stories of police violence, resides heavily in the way they 
ideologically construct the NYPD - and policing more generally - as a mockery of the very 
values of freedom and justice such institutions claim to represent. Further, @MoreAndAgain’s 
employment of direct address - it is you the NYPD will carry, you who has a kink in your neck 
and you whose hair is being pulled - calls upon an online community of individuals who are 
presumably at risk for experiencing police violence themselves. 
In a tweet shared thousands of times, @TheRealKeori also used humor, in this case snark 
(a snide remark) to caption a photo of a group of NYPD officers, uniformed and smiling, 
standing between a TD Bank and a Byzantium Security billboard reading “We’re not for 
Everyone. Just the 1% that Matters” (Figure 5 right).  The caption, “Sometimes the jokes write 
themselves,” again calls on a presumed online community who will ‘get’ the implied joke about 
the NYPD only existing to protect the powerful and wealthy. In both these examples, individual 
tweeters speak to a larger counterpublic community with a set of accepted concerns and critiques 
about the role of policing in a society aspiring to be equal for all.  
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[insert Figure 5 here] 
Channeling rage/constructing outrage. Castells (2009, 2012) has explored how the fear 
and rage of individual citizens in the face of state sponsored injustices becomes mass outrage as 
these citizens share their experiences and feelings through technological networks. In fact, the 
success of activist organizations and social movements is inherently linked to masses of people, 
from multiple networks, sharing a sense of outrage. Further, outrage is one of the only forms of 
citizen affect mainstream media rewards with attention.4 While certainly the use of satire by our 
crowdsourced elites worked to channel rage and construct outrage, this task was embraced far 
most explicitly by activist organizations like CopWatch, a group dedicated to teaching citizens 
their rights around monitoring and reporting police abuses, and the digital activist collective 
Anonymous. These groups used disturbing images that sometimes included bloody, battered, 
bruised, and even dead bodies alongside discursive hyperbole.  
For example, the NYPD was compared to the Ku Klux Klan (see Figure 6 left), 
“terrorists,” and “gang members,” while citizens traditionally understood as particularly 
vulnerable to violence like children, women, and the mentally ill were constructed as their 
victims. These tweets name “rape,” “torture,” “beatings,” and “murder” among acts committed 
by the NYPD and rely heavily on specific cases of police force, like those of Amadou Diallo, 
Ramarley Graham, Kimani Gray, Shantel Davis and Sean Bell. While such tweets often listed 
specifics of a case, like that “#myNYPD massacred Sean Bell in his car on his wedding day” and 
“17-year old Deion Fludd” was “beaten into a quadriplegic by #myNYPD” (Figure 6 right) they 
also relied heavily on affective images of victims of police violence, pushing the online 
community to see the humanity and vulnerability in these figures, as opposed to the seeming 
senselessness of the NYPD. 
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[insert Figure 6 here] 
Further, while the images that accompanied satirical #myNYPD tweets often showed the 
victims of police violence to be people of color without naming this phenomenon, those that 
focused on constructing outrage openly called the NYPD structurally racist. For example, 
@Copwatch tweeted that “#myNYPD is racist, no matter what color the officers are,” and 
@YourAnonNews offered a “Fuck you, #myNYPD” to what they described as “violent, racist 
police oppression.” 
Unifying Counternarratives. Finally, it should be noted that the most retweeted 
crowdsourced elite in the hijacking of #myNYPD was @OccupyWallStNYC with more than 
double the in-degree (660) of the next most-retweeted crowdsourced elite (@Vice, in-degree 
315). The visibility of Occupy Wall Street within the counterpublic of #myNYPD hijackers is 
perhaps not surprising, given the recent high visibility of the Occupy Wall Street movement, and 
their history of successfully leveraging Twitter for social activism (Conover et al, 
2013).  However, @OccupyWallStNYC has far fewer followers than either @YourAnonNews or 
@CopWatch, suggesting that it was more successful in creating messages that resonated with a 
diversity of #myNYPD hijackers and the publics they reflect. Our findings support this idea, as 
@OccupyWallStNYC made extensive use of discourses of both satire (as seen in Figure 2) and 
outrage in their critiques of the NYPD, frequently combining critiques of police force with 
critiques of unfettered capitalism, and serving as a megaphone for alternative news stories on the 
#myNYPD hijacking.  
For example, alongside sarcastic captioning of images of police force as “Free Massages 
from the #myNYPD,” @OccupyWallStNYC variously tweeted: “#myNYPD: Protecting the 
corporations from the citizens since 1857” alongside a photo of riot-gear clad police on guard in 
Running Head: HIJACKING #myNYPD 19 
front of a Chase bank; “#myNYPD killed Deion Fludd, Kimani Gray, Ramarley Graham, Shantel 
David, Sean Bell, Shem Walker, Amadou Diallo, Kyam Livingston #RestInPower”; and a link to 
an Al Jazeera story on the hijacking with the tweet “New York cops fall flat with #myNYPD as 
Twitter users swamp campaign with brutality photos.” While not an exhaustive list of popular 
@OccupyWallStNYC tweets, these examples demonstrate the way the organization adopted and 
reflected various counterpublic strategies in one place, a strategy that gave them the most 
influence in the network. 
Primary discursive trends in mainstream news coverage of #myNYPD  
Of the six national news channels and networks for which we collected data, only half 
covered the hijacking of #myNYPD - CNN, MSNBC, and NBC - the latter two sharing the same 
parent company. FoxNews, CBS, and ABC ignored the story altogether. All three of the New 
York-based newspapers, The New York Times, New York Post, and New York Daily News 
covered the hashtag and its hijacking. Coverage in New York-based papers is perhaps not 
surprising given the locality of the issues at play, but considering television news’ general focus 
on new, developing events we view it as particularly significant that the hijacking was treated as 
an event itself, drawing national coverage in some, if not all, of these outlets. Across all 
mainstream sources that covered #myNYPD, the most commonly constructed frame for telling 
the story was that of a public relations failure. Within this frame, the NYPD was largely 
constructed as having made a good-faith effort to engage its Twitter followers.  
Sources variously called the NYPD’s use of the hashtag “earnest” “encouraging” “a 
friendly callout” “community outreach” and “good intentioned.”5 Together, such discourse 
framed the NYPD in a positive light even while acknowledging that the hashtag became a “fail,” 
“backfire,” and “mishap.” Thus, the NYPD was framed as a hapless victim of its own lack of 
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foresight and social media literacy. As NBC’s Dylan Dreyer reported, “The New York City 
Police Department has seen the wrath of social media. Haven’t we all?” (“Divers are beginning,” 
2014). This construction of the NYPD’s campaign as what The New York Times (Goodman, 
2014) called “an embarrassing stumble” is notably sympathetic, a finding that cannot be 
detached from the realities of mainstream news making, which tends to rely heavily on 
governmental elites and institutions like police for information and as sources. In fact, across all 
mainstream stories collected here, the only sources quoted were NYPD commissioner Bill 
Bratton and other police department spokespeople. Thus, representatives of the state were given 
an opportunity to frame the meaning of the hijacking that was not available to citizens or 
organizations using Twitter to agitate for change. 
Mainstream newsmakers framed Twitter as a medium, and the citizens who engaged in 
the #myNYPD hijacking, in far less generous terms. However, this framing reflected more 
variance by source. For example, The New York Times, CNN, and NBC all constructed Twitter 
as something of a Wild West of communication where “storms of users” “dredged up” 
“backlash” in order to “bombard” the NYPD. CNN’s John Berman offered that, “The lesson 
here, live by Twitter, die by Twitter,” (“No air pockets,” 2014) and NBC’s Natalie Morales 
similarly offered, “Once you open up that floodgate, it’s hard to close it” (“Divers are 
beginning,” 2014). This framing failed to engage on issues of police brutality and profiling, or 
questions of accountability or impact on citizens. Instead, it contributed to constructing the 
NYPD - a government organization - as just as vulnerable to online criticism as any Twitter user, 
and the platform itself as hostile to public relations efforts. The suggestion that Twitter as a 
platform is in any way hostile to public relations campaigns entirely ignores the reality of its 
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technological architecture - constructed first and foremost around facilitating advertising and the 
spread of elite messages (Poell, 2014). 
A more extreme version of the framing of Twitter users, and online critics of the NYPD 
in particular, as hostile was evident in the two New York based tabloid-style papers. The New 
York Post and New York Daily News called #myNYPD hijackers “derisive” “police adversaries” 
who were “gross, sloppy and plain wrong,” labeling their claims “mocking and angry” “vitriol.”6 
These publications also called hijackers “cop-haters,” “anti-cop” and “trolls” and the New York 
Post used the sexist term “web wag” to refer to one female NYPD critic.7 This highly negative 
framing of those who hijacked #myNYPD severely limited the possibility that legitimacy would 
be given to their concerns or that Twitter as a platform could be legitimized as contributing to 
democratic conversations. Further, the Daily News and Post went above and beyond the 
construction of the NYPD’s public relations attempt as benign, adding explicitly complementary 
descriptions of the organization, including that it had “bent over backwards to heal wounds real 
and perceived” and “saved thousands of lives, many of them belonging to young black and 
Latino men” (“Editorial #ourNYPD,” 2014). This outright defense of the NYPD and derision of 
its online critics illustrates the severe limitations Twitter publics face in attempting to intervene 
in local mainstream conversations. These findings also suggest a strong, even undemocratic, link 
between the state and those defining the terms of debate in the mainstream public sphere.  
Among mainstream news sources, only MSNBC produced an in depth analysis of the 
hijacking of #myNYPD. This analysis, while also including framing that constructed the 
NYPD’s attempt at community outreach as benign, treated the hijacking of the hashtag as a 
legitimate form of activism and engaged complexly with concerns over police brutality. 
MSNBC’s Ari Melber frequently referred to those using #myNYPD to criticize policing 
Running Head: HIJACKING #myNYPD 22 
practices as “the people” and noted, “Now, here is the thing about telling the story in a two-way 
media, the people can respond with their own story. And that is what they did...If you ask people 
for their stories, you better be prepared to listen to them” (“Last word,” 2014). Melber also called 
the hijacking a “grassroots” “protest template” - discursive constructs that clearly link the 
hijacking to activism. Melber went on to further legitimize the hijacking stating: 
Anyone who follows politics today knows about the simplistic and often false choice of 
whether we should be agitating on the Internet or on the streets. But here is the thing 
about most of the photos. They were all taken in the streets. They all happened in the 
streets. Yet many of them didn`t achieve initially any great impact, let alone response 
from the city or the press until they found traction through the online publishing 
platforms (“Last word,” 2014).  
Melber’s discourse here not only frames the hijacking as activism and identifies what 
happens “on the streets” as a real issue people should be paying attention to, his invocation of 
“we” also suggests that “agitation” is something members of the public sphere he is speaking to 
should be and are engaging in. Here, we see the clear integration of the agitational goals of 
counterpublics seeking to interrupt dominant narratives of policing within a mainstream space.  
We suggest this multifaceted and legitimizing coverage reflects MSNBC’s brand 
construction as an antidote to the conservative-leaning FoxNews (a network that did not cover 
the story at all). MSNBC’s homepage describes it as a place for “news, video, and progressive 
community” and the network’s slogan “Lean Forward” also discursively evokes the concept of 
social progress. Further, while Melber is a fairly traditional journalist, his framing of #myNYPD 
took place while sitting in for political analyst Lawrence O’Donnell on a program MSNBC 
describes as “channeling O’Donnell’s extensive background in politics and entertainment” 
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(MSNBC.com). This suggests there are spaces and opportunities for the dissent of online 
counterpublics to be taken seriously in the mainstream public sphere in America, although these 
spaces, and the willingness of their creators to openly identify with something closer to advocacy 
journalism, remain in the minority.     
Perhaps most importantly, MSNBC’s coverage of the hijacking of #myNYPD was used 
to open up a conversation that provided more details about police brutality and profiling than in 
any other mainstream source. MSNBC’s Melber acknowledged that the NYPD was a 
“controversial” force and listed “clashes” “over the right to protest,” “surveilling Muslim 
communities and systematically stopping and frisking young black men” as realities for “a lot of 
people” and legitimate reasons for anger and criticism (“Last word,” 2014). This framing stands 
in stark contrast to the ways brutality and profiling where (and were not) discussed in the other 
mainstream sources we examined. Mainstream sources like CNN and The New York Times only 
briefly touched on concerns over police brutality, using euphemisms like “holding down” to 
describe images of police in violent one-on-one interactions with citizens and describing these 
interactions as “infamous moments” and “unfavorable images” of the NYPD. While mainstream 
sources other than MSNBC noted that the images used in hijacking #myNYPD “appeared to 
show police brutality,” there was no critical or specific engagement with police brutality as a 
social phenomenon and the larger framing of the story as one about a public relations fail 
overwhelmed these single mentions. 
Thus, for the most part, mainstream news sources either reappropriated #myNYPD from 
members of online counterpublics in a way that realigned it with dominant narratives that ignore 
the severity of police brutality and fail to legitimate discourses arising from online 
counterpublics, or ignored the hijacking altogether. While some mainstream sources, particularly 
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the New York-based tabloids, engaged in reappropriation to defend the NYPD and minimize and 
malign online activists, most mainstream reappropriation depoliticized the hashtag altogether by 
framing the hijacking as a lesson in twenty-first century marketing, a frame that treated the 
NYPD as a business rather than a government institution with a duty to protect citizens. Hence, 
there is no question that mainstream gatekeeping of public debates and the centering of dominant 
narratives at the expense of ones arising from counterpublics are alive and well in America. Yet, 
in spite of this limited coverage of the hijacking of #myNYPD, its visibility as a story in the 
mainstream public sphere is noteworthy as it, at the very least, exposed audiences to the 
existence of counterpublic spaces that actively engage in critiques of the state. In the case of 
MSNBC, narratives produced by counterpublics using Twitter seemed to more closely overlap 
with those in the mainstream, offering legitimacy to both Twitter as a platform and the political 
frameworks of activists and citizens who use it. Ultimately, with varying success, the hijacking 
of #myNYPD had real influence over the presence and shape of mainstream conversations about 
policing. 
Discussion  
According to Papacharissi and de Fatima Oliveira (2012), Twitter hashtags as frames for 
naming social phenomena, events, and institutions “are both attempts to claim power by 
cognitively characterizing an event and are simultaneously inviting of affective language” (p. 
278). Our findings not only reveal discursive, affective, and thereby ideological struggle in the 
meaning-making process around #myNYPD, but also a move toward the democratization of the 
public sphere through the virality of the hashtag’s hijacking. 
As public sphere and social movement scholars have long theorized, the development of 
strategies to infiltrate mainstream public discourse is a primary marker, and marks one of the 
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primary measures of efficacy, of counterpublics. Thus, despite the decentralized nature of 
sending individual tweets, we suggest that the collective hijacking and trending of  #myNYPD 
reveal an intentional and nearly spontaneous strategic effort; an effort that exemplifies how 
counterpublic strategies meant to infiltrate mainstream narratives have adapted to the 
technological architecture of Twitter. These efforts can be successful, in large part, because 
Twitter’s architecture allows conceptually related, but otherwise disconnected messages to be 
stitched together in a networked narrative that becomes newsworthy, even by mainstream 
standards. No single tweet introduced alternative narratives of policing, but a collection of tweets 
and the validation implied by retweets allowed these narratives to temporarily gain traction in the 
public sphere.   
It is clear from our findings that Twitter functions as a useful tool for counterpublics to 
share in-group knowledge and experience about police brutality and that through the strategic 
use of Twitter these counterpublics have the power to motivate the mainstream public sphere to 
take note and respond. Our findings further illustrate that Twitter counterpublics are more 
diverse and inclusive than the mainstream public sphere - many of our online crowdsourced 
elites were women and people of color with no elite status elsewhere (as compared to the 
overwhelmingly white and mostly male news anchors, reporters, and sources that reinterpreted 
their message in the mainstream public sphere). 
While these findings and their implications are significant, many have been cautious not 
to overly idealize Twitter’s potential for highlighting a diverse set of voices in a meaningful way. 
Twitter is not a revolutionized, or even generally counternormative, space for information 
creation and dispersal. As Poell (2014) points out, the economic and technological architecture 
of Twitter is certainly founded in dominant values that prioritize the needs of advertisers and 
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elites over others. Further, the structure of the platform still allows the segmentation of publics 
and the sheer quantity of information at any given moment means it is easy to miss the 
construction of particular narratives as they come and go with a speed unique to the medium. 
And of course, the mere presence of counterpublic narratives on Twitter, even as trending topics, 
does not guarantee a sustained or substantive engagement with these narratives by the state or 
members of mainstream institutions, or even of the majority of members of the counterpublics 
themselves (Conover, Ferrara, Menczer & Flammini, 2013).  
While our work here highlights an improvement in permeability between the dominant 
public sphere and counterpublics, it also surely demonstrates that power and gatekeeping still 
matter in what frames for understanding dissent and social protest are made available to the 
general public. Just as citizens and activist collectives hijacking #myNYPD sought to take back 
power from narratives that legitimize policing, the original use of the hashtag by the NYPD was 
no less tied to the intentional positioning of power and affect. Further, the contributions of 
mainstream news media demonstrate how the dominant public sphere reflects (or fails to reflect) 
discourses that are counter to those presented by the state. This three-way struggle raises 
important questions about who has access and power to decide how stories are told in the public 
sphere, and links members of counterpublics, albeit with serious limitations, to powerful 
institutions and journalists. 
Our findings are consistent with prior research that suggests that mainstream news 
organizations and affiliated journalists tend to have ambivalent attitudes toward Twitter (Lasorsa, 
Lewis, & Holton, 2012).  However, when the story itself becomes about Twitter (or rather, what 
people are doing with Twitter), our data suggests that many mainstream newsmakers feel 
compelled to acknowledge how social media are being used by citizens to both bypass traditional 
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spaces for information creation and to perform the “watchdog” role journalism once prided itself 
on. While our findings indicate that publics creating discourse through Twitter can model a 
quasi-democratic sphere, we also recognize that the same cannot be said of more traditional 
media. In particular, frames that focus on the supposed risks and negativity of social media and 
the logistics of branding - as opposed to the social problem of police brutality - cripple the larger 
public’s access to counterpublic narratives. Yet, in covering and responding to counternarratives 
on Twitter, even mainstream journalists who dismissed them introduced some citizen journalism 
and counterpublic knowledge to their audience. 
If drawing mainstream attention to the issue of police brutality, especially as experienced 
by young people and people of color, was the goal of members of online counterpublics who 
hijacked #myNYPD, they certainly succeeded. Yet, the repackaged and reappropriated 
discussion of these issues in the mainstream public sphere lost much of the democratic, 
proactive, anti-authority power it contained within Twitter counterpublics - except on one 
program on MSNBC. Thus, we are cautiously optimistic about the porousness between dominant 
and marginalized forms of knowledge production in the twenty-first century. 
We believe the hijacking of #myNYPD reflects a larger pattern of counterpublic activism 
that relies on virality as a strategy and are excited to expand the questions at the core of this 
research. Several months after the hijacking of #myNYPD, and in the wake of the police 
shooting of unarmed black teenager Michael Brown, other hashtags critical of police brutality - 
including #Ferguson and #BlackLivesMatter - contributed to moving citizens across the nation 
into on the ground protests and certainly influenced mainstream debates about racial justice, 
policing, and the state. In future work we plan to investigate these hashtags alongside other 
highly debated issues pertaining to civil society, inclusion, and marginalization in order to better 
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understand contemporary questions of the public sphere, networked publics, and social change. 
Finally, we believe our research has demonstrated the importance of fusing network analytics 
with critical and discursive approaches for studying the role of networked publics in our ever-
evolving democracy.  
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Figures 
 
 
Figure 1. The original #myNYPD tweet, issued by the New York City Police Department 
(@NYPDNews) on April 22, 2014.  
 
 
Running Head: HIJACKING #myNYPD 34 
 
 
Figure 2. Example of a hijacked #myNYPD tweet, in this case Occupy Wall Street 
(@OccupyWallStNYC) using sarcasm to illustrate NYPD brutality.  
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Figure 3. Graphical representation of the node-link structure of the #myNYPD retweet/mention 
network. Nodes are sized by in-degree and arranged to minimize distance between linked nodes. 
The twelve highest in-degree nodes (the crowdsourced elites) are labeled, and nodes and links 
are colored such that retweets/mention links and nodes are the same color as the source node. 
The image was created in Gephi 0.8.2 using the Fruchterman-Reingold force-directed layout 
algorithm.  
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Figure 4. Hijacked tweet by @KimaniFilm retweeting the NY Police Department’s 
(@NYPDNews) request for photos with a counternarrative image.  
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Figure 5. Examples of counterpublic tweets that use sarcasm (left) and snark (right) as discursive 
strategies.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Examples of counterpublic tweets that use hyperbole (left) and outrage (right) as 
discursive strategies.  
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1 Months after #myNYPD, citizens used #AskACop, a hashtag created by CNN to tag questions for police officers 
appearing on a news program, to express outrage about police-citizen interactions. Around the same time, 
#CosbyMeme, a hashtag created by the comedian Bill Cosby for promotional purposes trended when it was used by 
women’s rights advocates to highlight allegations of rape against the comedian.  
2 The standard sample rate for the streaming API is 1% of all tweets. However, Twitter grants access to a 10% 
sample (sometimes called the “garden hose”) on a case-by-case basis. Our data were obtained through an 
individually negotiated 10% stream (citation omitted for blind review). 
3 Herein we define mainstream media as any media based in one-way corporate logics and dominant culture. This 
dominant model of media production, which includes an exclusion of historically marginalized viewpoints, has and 
continues to determine the primary economic, political and logistic means of information creation and dispersal in 
America (Hall, 2000; Squires, 2007). 
4 The more difficult part of this affective use of outrage in social movements, Castells (2009, 2012) notes, is 
balancing outrage with the hope that change is possible. 
5 For examples, see, “NYPD,” 2014; “Divers,” 2014; “Last Word,” 2014.   
6 For examples, see: Goodman, 2014; “Bratton,” 2014; “Divers,” 2014. 
7 For examples, see: “Bratton,” 2014; “NYPD TWEET BEAT,” 2014.  
 
                                                        
